Cyberspace in peace and war /

"Cyberspace in Peace and War presents a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity, cyberwar, and cyber terrorism. From basic concepts to advanced principles, Libicki examines the sources and consequences of system compromises, addresses how cybersecurity policies can strengthen countries def...

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Main Author: Libicki, Martin C., (Author)
Format: EBOOK
Published: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2016]
Series:Transforming war.
Online Access:Go to eBook
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Table of Contents:
  • Title Page; Copyright; Contents; List of Illustrations; List of Acronyms and Abbreviations; Introduction; PART I. FOUNDATIONS; Chapter 1. Emblematic Attacks; Cybercrime and Other System Intrusions; The Advanced Persistent Threat; Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks; Stuxnet and Other Destructive Attacks; Chapter 2. Some Basic Principles; Cyberwar and Cyberspace; How Hackers Work; Agoras and Castles; Most Cyberattacks Have Transitory Effects; Chapter 3. How to Compromise a Computer; Abuses by Authorized Internal Users; Abuses by Everyday External Users.
  • Altered Instructions via Supply Chain AttackMalware; Chapter 4. The Search for Cybersecurity; Applications Are Often the Weak Links in the Security Chain; The Role of Input Filtering; The Role of Operating Systems; The Role of People; The Role of Cryptography; A Role for Firewalls?; The Role of Air-Gapping; Relationships among Machines, Systems, and Engineering; Mixing and Matching Security Actions; Measures and Countermeasures; What Could We Learn?; Chapter 5. Defending Against Attacks of High and of Broad Consequence; Attacks of High Consequence.
  • Identifying Near-Catastrophes to Get Ahead of CatastrophesHedging to Deal with Exceptions to the Power-Law Rule; Scalability Influences How Well a Near-Catastrophe Predicts a Catastrophe; Attacks of Broad Consequence; Implications for Learning; Is Information Sharing a Panacea?; Chapter 6. What the Government Can and Cannot Do; First, Why Should the Government Do Anything?; What the Wise Men Recommended; Good Policies; Panaceas; Bad Ideas; On Using Extraordinary Incentives to Juice the Cybersecurity Workforce; Can Governments Cope with Surprise?; PART II. POLICIES.
  • Chapter 7. What Should Be SecretThe Calculus; Denying an Adversary Something; Affecting Adversary Knowledge; Affecting Adversary Decisionmaking; Adverse to Us; Some Implications of Logical Classification Rules; The Importance of Aggregate Privacy; The Benefits of Discretion; Conclusions and Implications; Chapter 8. What Does China's Economically Motivated Cyberespionage Cost the United States?; What's at Stake?; How Much Trade Is at Issue?; Displaced U.S. Exports; Displaced Value Added by U.S. Corporations; Summary Calculations; Conclusions; Chapter 9. Return to Vendor.
  • What Should the NSA Do About Zero Days?Retain or Return: Some Criteria; After How Long Should a Zero Day Be Returned to Vendor?; Irrelevant Considerations; Conclusions; Chapter 10. Cybersecurity Futures; Better Offense; A Larger Attack Surface; Better Defense; New Tools for Defense; A Three Mile Island in Cyberspace; Chapter 11. Operational Cyberwar; Possible Effects; Timing Cyberattacks; The Role of Surprise; Hiding the Attack to Facilitate Its Repetition; An Operational Cyberwar Scenario; Would China Use Operational Cyberwar the Same Way?